Muslim Rage Based In Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy theories and extremism go hand in hand because the theories are generally invented to advance a political objective.  Muslims have been whipped into a rage countless times by firebrand clerics lying about some supposed offense or threat to Islam.  It shouldn’t come as a great surprise that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s brother in law recently reported that Tamerlan was enamored of conspiracy theories. reports that:  Boston Bombers Were Angry Because People Thought Islam was a Violent Religion



“He was looking for connections between the wars in the Middle East and oppression of Muslim population around the globe”

There’s a big difference between, suspicion and curiosity, and unquestioning belief in unsubstantiated theories that defy mountains of facts to the contrary.  After you have taken the time to debunk a particular conspiracy theory, take a few minutes to consider who would benefit from inventing such a theory and you will be on track to discover the real conspiracy.

Here are a few of the more popular and resoundingly disproved conspiracy theories (every one of these is absolute total bunk).

Israel intentionally attacked the USS Liberty in 1967.
The Jews control the mainstream media.
The US or Israeli governments either allowed or orchestrated the 9/11 attacks.
Muslims only attack us because of our foreign policy.
The US never landed on the moon.
Someone is spraying chemicals (chemtrails) into the clouds.
The Illuminati (Jewish Bankers) cause all of the wars in the world just to profit from loans.
There are or were aliens living here.
There is something evil in the Bermuda triangle.
The government has aliens or alien spacecraft in Roswell NM.
AIDS is a government created virus intended to.
Hitler was a Christian.
Mohamed and Islam were and are peaceful.
The holocaust is a hoax.
The country of Israel has no claim to the land it sits on.
Guns not people cause violence.
Muslims fought against Hitler in WWII.
You don’t have to pay taxes because the 16th amendment was never ratified.
The US government is actually federal corporation.
The US government is operating under admiralty law.
The US government is at war with Islam.
Islam isn’t at war with the rest of the world.
Unborn babies aren’t human.
The US government will never go bankrupt.
The government can do whatever it collectively decides to do.
The Tea Party is a bunch of simple minded racists.
The polar icecaps are going to melt in the next 2 years and the entire world will be underwater.
The KKK was not part of the Democrat party.

It’s exactly these types of inflammatory conspiracy theories (thoroughly debunked countless times) that cause people to take irrational actions.  Consider the irrational action likely to be provoked and who would want such a thing to happen and you will be well on your way to discovering the real conspiracy behind conspiracy theories.

Failing to challenge conspiracy theorists is exactly the kind of failure that allowed two Muslim men from Boston to believe they needed to attack their unsuspecting and infinitely more sane neighbors.

Trial of Jihadist Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan To Begin In May

Maj. Nidal Malik HasanThe trial of Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder, is scheduled to begin in May.

A new judge has been assigned to the case and Hasan’s delay tactic challenges are being rapidly resolved. (Who really cares if he is convicted with a beard or without one? The important point is that he stand trial and face the consequences of his actions.)

Several witnesses have testified at pretrial hearings that they heard Hasan shout. “Allahu akbar” — Arabic for “God is great” — before opening fire.

Although military executions are rare, Hasan could be an exception.

The last military execution was that of John Bennett, hanged on April 13, 1961, for the rape and attempted murder of an 11-year-old Austrian girl.

Islamophobia Accusations Hamper Counter Terrorism Efforts

Have you thought about what could have stopped the Boston bombing?

The simple fact, known to virtually everyone, is that Islam produces terrorists like no other ideology known to man. The problem is that anyone that mentions this unquestionable fact is branded a racist hatemonger and any potential deeper discussion or understanding is suffocated.

The left (who have no problem with 3300 babies killed per day) thinks the war on terrorism is pointless, they offer no alternative strategy – just criticism and resignation that the problem is unsolvable so it’s pointless to try. Their view of people on the right is so jaundiced that they imagine that any discussion of the Islam problem will generate acts of violence against innocent Muslims. It’s not hard to understand why they worry about such things because they themselves adhere to a set of beliefs that advocates imposing their particular set of values onto others using force. The history of the left is a brutal bloody one which includes individual vigilantism, terrorism, and numerous state sponsored and executed genocides.

Not everything the left says is wrong nor are their concerns completely without merit. No one disagrees that we need to prevent vigilante justice and trampling of civil and constitutional rights. We would, however all be much better served if the left put as much effort into cleaning up their own violence promoting factions as they do projecting their own problems onto the right.

Defendants of our current strategy point out that 50 terrorist attacks have been foiled since 9/11 and call for a stepped up effort every time there is a near miss or successful attack. Preventing most of the attacks (2 successful attacks in 52 events is approximately a 4% success rate) which is fine unless you’re one of the unlucky ones.

One could say that we had just been lucky until the Boston attacks but the truth is that ordinary citizens have played a role in virtually all of the prevented terror attacks.

The one common factor that is crucial in preventing terror attacks is detection and recognition of terrorists before they take action. In order to detect and recognize we must have a public which is educated about the characteristics, behaviours and beliefs of the potential terrorist. That means not only admitting that terrorists are virtually always Muslims, but also that terrorism is a form of Jihad. It means learning to recognize the behaviors of a person that is becoming a fundamentalist which include attitudes and behaviours directed towards specific groups called out in Islamic texts for castigation such as women, non-Muslims, Jews, Christians and non fundamentalist Muslims.

If the Muslim community wants to be partners in this battle they need to stop opposing the efforts to battle terrorism by labelling anyone interested in exploring characteristics of potential terrorists to be Islamophobes and join the discussion.

There is ample evidence that the Tsarnaevs had displayed numerous behaviours that should have made them stand out as potential terror suspects. Law enforcement isn’t the problem, detection and recognition of terrorism is the problem. Detection and recognition depend on an informed public as the first line of defense something that is increasingly difficult to accomplish where leftists want discussion of the relationship between Islam and terrorism to be being criminalized.

If the Islamophobia accusers carry the day, fewer and fewer people will come forward with suspicions. Would you report a potential terrorist if doing so was likely to cause you to be accused of a crime?

Paris Suburb Awards Honorary Citizenship to Palestinian Terrorist in Israeli Jail

Al-Rimawi,  sentenced by an Israeli court to life imprisonment plus 80 years for participating in the planning and murder of Israeli Minister Rechavam Zeevi in 2001, has been awarded Honorary Citizenship by the Bezons suburb of Paris. The inscription on the plaque prepared by the municipality refers to Al-Rimawi as a “political prisoner.”

In reality, Al-Rimawi is a member of the terrorist group, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which has been responsible for perpetrating scores of deadly attacks against Israeli civilians.


Rehavam Ze’evi, Israel’s tourism minister, was assassinated on Wednesday, 17 October 2001, at the Hyatt Hotel in Jerusalem by a squad of Palestinians assassins acting on behalf of the PFLP militant organization.

Here is video of Palestinians celebrating the assassination of Rehavam Ze’evi:

The European Jewish Congress (EJC) has slammed the decision by Bezons, a suburb of Paris, to grant terrorist murderer Majdi al-Rimawi “honorary citizenship.”

“This is an outrageous and horrific decision, not just to honor a murderer, but the murderer of an Israeli government cabinet minister,” EJC President, Dr. Moshe Kantor, said. “Today is exactly a year since the terrible and tragic murder of Jewish schoolchildren in Toulouse and the honoring of al-Rimawi in France demonstrates that murder and terrorism is being glorified when it should be condemned in all forms.”

“We call on the French authorities to immediately remove this stain on the French landscape out of respect for a friendly government, the people of France and tolerance.”

The Mayor of the city of Bezons, Dominique Lesparre, made a speech at the ceremony honoring Rimawi in which he justified the acts of the convicted terrorist murderer, calling him a “victim”.

“It is inconceivable that an elected figure can be so ignorant to call a cold-blooded murderer a victim,” Kantor said. “This is the kind of ignorance which leads to people like Mohammed Merah perpetrating the murder of children because they are Jewish. This type of glorification of murder is sending a very ominous message to the next Merah.”

Since the Toulouse murders a year ago, there has been an upswing in anti-Semitism in France with Jews physically assaulted across the country. The EJC said that it recognizes the strong reaction in the aftermath of last year’s Toulouse murders, and also commends the current government under President Hollande. However, more needs to be done to reduce anti-Semitic attacks in the year since the horrific events of March 11, 2012.

“It is inconceivable that an elected figure can be so ignorant to call a cold-blooded murderer a victim,” said EJC President, Dr. Moshe Kantor. “This is the kind of ignorance which leads to people like Mohammed Merah perpetrating the murder of children because they are Jewish. This type of glorification of murder is sending a very ominous message to the next Merah.”

Read More:

Unindicted 1993 WTC Bombing Co-Conspirator to Headline at CAIR banquet

CAIR-PA Philadelphia Chapter will Hold its Seventh Annual Banquet on March 16th.

ImageThe banquet theme “Upholding Our Constitution, Embracing Our Faith” sounds patriotic and non-threatening but as with everything else, the Devil is in the Details.

One of the keynote speakers at CAIR’s event is IMAM SIRAJ WAHHAJ:

-Named as a possible co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

-Invited Omar Abdel-Rahman, leader of a terrorist organization known as the Islamic Group, to address his congregation several times

-Advocates the replacement of the U.S. government with an Islamic Caliphate
Supports violent Islamic jihad

I suppose when they say Upholding Our Constitution – they are not talking about the United States Constitution but rather some Islamic Constitution

Morocco 1942: Operation Torch – Muslim Racism Shocks American Military Leaders

On 8 November 1942, in Operation Torch, American and British forces landed in Morocco and Algeria. The U.S. Navy saw most of its action around Casablanca and elsewhere on Morocco’s Atlantic coast. Local French resistance was fierce, but short, and an armistice on 11 November ended the fighting. This ambitious trans-oceanic amphibious operation gave the Allies bases for future operations. In six more months, all of North Africa was cleared of Axis forces, opening the way for an invasion of Italy.-1

The Algerian administration vigorously enforced the anti-Semitic laws imposed by the Vichy-French government, which stripped Algerian Jews of their French citizenship.

After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria, General Henri Giraud, Free French commander in chief in North Africa, slowly rescinded repressive Vichy laws despite opposition by colon extremists. He also called on the Muslim population to supply troops for the Allied war effort. Ferhat Abbas and twenty-four other Muslim leaders replied that Algerians were ready to fight with the Allies in freeing their homeland but demanded the right to call a conference of Muslim representatives to develop political, economic, and social institutions for the indigenous population “within an essentially French framework.” Giraud, who succeeded in raising an army of 250,000 men to fight in the Italian campaign, refused to consider this proposal, explaining that “politics” must wait until the end of the war.

In March 1943, Abbas, who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination, presented the French administration with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, signed by fifty-six Algerian nationalist and international leaders. Outlining the past evils of colonial rule and denouncing continued suppression, the manifesto demanded specifically an Algerian constitution that would guarantee immediate and effective political participation and legal equality for Muslims.-2

In summary: After Hitler’s Nazi forces overran free France and the Nazi sympathetic Vichy came to power,  the Muslim population of Algeria happily sided with them in their brutal oppression of their Jewish neighbors (which is a nice way of saying they wanted to be rid of the Jews and could have cared less how it happened, come holocaust, come ethnic cleansing.

The United States and Great Britain  sent 70,000 soldiers to Algeria to liberate them from  not only anti-semitic German occupation but also promised self-determination and liberation from French  colonialism as well.  The Algerian Muslims response was that they were only interested in fighting if they would could establish a Sharia constitution that granted legal rights to Muslims only.

In the end, the only thing ‘shocking’ about this story is that we continue to be shocked by the unerring Muslim adherence to Sharia law and its full brutal plague of evil.

1- Naval History & Heritage Command, Operation Torch

2- US Library of Congress: Country Studies: Algeria - Polarization and Politicization

Germany: Jihadist Internet Propaganda Rising with Increased Muslim Population

A study by the Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) examines how many jihadists and sympathizers live in Germany as well as the new means by which propaganda is being spread.

Screen shot from a jihadist video (picture: dpa)


Jihadist Internet propaganda on the rise

A study by the Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) examines how many jihadists and sympathizers live in Germany as well as the new means by which propaganda is being spread.

On March 2, 2011, 21-year-old Arid Uka shot dead two US soldiers at the Frankfurt airport and severely wounded others. His motive was hatred against soldiers deployed in Afghanistan.

Previously Uka had seen a video on YouTube purporting to show Muslim women being raped by US soldiers. The young man frequented Islamist discussion forums online and regularly watched videos of radical preachers. However, he never had direct contact with jihadists.

Fredrik von Erichsen (picture: dpa)Alexander Eisvogel talks of “jihad 2.0 – a kind of virtual jihad”

Arid Uka represents a typical case of self-radicalization by way of the Internet, says Alexander Eisvogel, vice president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s internal security agency. Eisvogel told the daily “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” this year that he has observed what he dubs “jihad 2.0 – a kind of virtual jihad.”

The Internet offers a platform for what was once the domain of certain preachers, prayer circles and schools: Indoctrinating a social group against others.

From fax machines to Facebook

This represents a relatively new development in Germany. The Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) undertook a close study of the last 15 years of Jihad propaganda, producing a summary of its results. SWP experts say that around the year 2000, the Internet played just a small role. Al Qaeda sent its declarations via fax or recorded videos, which where then sent to TV broadcaster Al-Jazeera.

But shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, various Arabic forums advocating jihad gained influence.

German Islamist Abu Askar in a propaganda video (picture: dpa)German Islamist Abu Askar in a propaganda video

SWP terrorism researcher Guido Steinberg notes that a number of materials published online between 2003 and 2008 attracted lots of attention. They included the execution of American businessman Nicholas Berg in 2004. At the time, the Berlin study reports that terrorist groups still published their videos themselves. However, the authors add that sympathizers and supporters are becoming more and more active.

As the popularity of Facebook and Twitter escalated in recent years, jihadists have gotten active in social networks, and propaganda is now being generated from many countries around the world.

Transition to terrorism

Jihadist Internet propaganda in the German-speaking world began in 2005. In the early phases, propagators of the materials did not work very professionally, terrorism expert Steinberg told DW. They created convincing propaganda videos and translated Arabic texts in to German to reach a broader public.

“But on the other hand, it was often quite easy for security officials to see who was behind these activities,” he explained.

Guido Steinberg(c) DWSteinberg warns the videos are becoming ever more professional

A number of influential people within the movement were put in jail within the last ten years in Germany. But the displaced members were often quickly replaced, Steinberg said, citing the example of a group banned in summer 2012 called Gemeinschaft Abrahams (The Abraham Alliance). Its leaders have now left Germany, moving abroad to continue publishing propaganda from abroad.

“That raises concerns because this content is constantly being spread online,” he said. Steinberg fears that the jihadists may not just be disseminating anti-Western materials but actively trying to build up terrorist structures.

Peculiarities in Germany

The development of terror groups has taken a different form in Germany compared with other countries in recent years. Apparently the language barrier to propaganda written in Arabic was very high for many radicals living in Germany, Guido Steinberg said.

“The German scene is heavily shaped by recruits with Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds, and in most cases they have gone on to join organizations based in Uzbekistan.”

The Turkish and Uzbek languages have the same roots, just as certain segments of the Turkish and Uzbekistani populations. By eliminating the language barrier, groups like the Islamische Dschihad-Union (Islamist Jihad Union) or the Islamische Bewegung Usbekistans (Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan) have been able to attract young men to train as fighters.

Modern tools targeting modernity

A still from a video calling for jihad in German (picture: dpa)A video calls for jihad in German

The case of Arid Uka is a reminder that terrorist groups can persuade their followers remotely, with no physical contact. Uka was fascinated by German-language propaganda online. That’s no surprise to Guido Steinberg: “The producers of these materials have become enormously professional.”

Videos have come into favor as a tool for radicalization, and they’ve shown their effectiveness, Steinberg argues.

Researcher Nico Prucha expresses his astonishment about propaganda of this sort in the SWP report: “Ironically, Jihadists are using the most modern methods of communication in order to fight against modernity.”

The SWP study estimates Germany is home to just a few hundred jihadists as well as several thousand supporters and sympathizers. With numbers that small, Steinberg suggests that when influential figures in the scene are arrested, attempts should be made to convert them. They might then help stop messages supporting armed conflict.

Faulty Foreign Policy Assumptions About Islam: The place where Democrats and Republicans See Eye-to-Eye

After the fall of communism, the Democrat administration of President Bill Clinton assumed that there was no threat to U.S. interests, the indisputable evidence of the rise of Shari’a-compliant Islam notwithstanding. Clinton pretended that the Islamic jihadist attack on the New York World Trade Center in 1993; the Islamic jihadist attack on U.S. military famine relief force in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993; the Islamic jihadist attack on the U.S. Air Force troop barracks in the Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia in 1996; the Islamic jihadist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in 1998; the Islamic jihadist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998; and the Islamic jihadist attack on the USS Cole in 2000 were not Islamic-motivated terrorism! It doesn’t get any more dysfunctional than that! After seven years of Islamic jihadist attacks and threats of attacks, most directly traceable to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, U.S. foreign policy was still functioning on the Democrat Party’s baseless assumptions that Islam is benign and poses no national threat to the U.S. In reality, Clinton’s foreign policy was principally to subordinate his goal of getting reelected in the 1996, and in his second term Clinton’s foreign policy priority was primarily to preclude failures in order to preserve his “legacy”. As a result, Clinton passed up several opportunities to take out bin Laden and al-Qaeda in his caution to avoid hard decisions that had the potential for consequential gain or disaster. Clinton’s Democrat administration dealt with the Islamic jihadists and their terror attacks as international outlaws committing crimes in an effort to mislead the American public about the Islamic threat. Clinton worked diligently to cover up the ineptitude of his denial policy regarding Islamic jihad to preserve the fiction of his foreign policy effectiveness. A sympathetic media assisted him greatly in his prevarication.

Then came the Republican administration of President George W. Bush. Shortly after taking office, Bush was confronted by the second jihadist attack on the New York World Trade Center in 2001. After almost 3,000 Americans were murdered on 9/11 by Islamic jihadists, the Islamic religious connection to the continuing terrorism against the U.S. was no longer deniable, although many Republican and Democrat politicians and policy makers still try to this day. Nevertheless, Bush advanced the ball forward from where Clinton had left it by acknowledging that the 9/11 perpetrators were in fact Islamic jihadists, not criminals, and by declaring the U.S. response to the Islamic jihad was a “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Of course, the idea of declaring war against the “tactic of terror” rather than declaring war on the Islamic jihadists using the tactic of terror discredited the concept of “GWOT” from the beginning, and more ominously it indicated that there was a continuation of some variation of Clinton’s denial that Shari’a-compliant Islam is a national security threat.

According to President Bush’s 2010 memoir, Decision Points, the “Bush Doctrine” for fighting Islamic terror contained four fundamental precepts. Unfortunately, the fourth precept ultimately cancelled the effectiveness of the other three out, thus undermining and ultimately destroying Bush’s GWOT by the end of his second term in office. The Bush Doctrine precepts were:

  1. “Make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them–and hold both to account.”
  2. “Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at home.”
  3. “Confront threats before they fully materialize.”
  4. “Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear.”

The difference between the assumptions underpinning Democrat and Republican foreign policy is one of degree rather than substance.

Clinton worked on the assumption that the Islamic religion was no factor at all in the attacks on the U.S., while Bush’s equally invalid assumption was that a hijacked, perverted version of Islam was motivating misguided Muslims to commit their murderous acts. Consequently, different degrees of politically correctness denying the violent, imperialistic character of Islam was the difference between Clinton and Bush. Lamentably these politically correct, reality-adverse interpretations of Islam still underlie Democratic and Republican basic foreign policy assumptions about Islam, rendering both dysfunctional.

To make matters worse, President Barack Obama’s Democrat regime, that replaced the Bush’ Republican administration in 2009, dropped even the inadequate Republican assumption that Islamic jihadist terror stemmed from a hijacked, perverted version of Islam. Instead Obama’s national security policy and strategy documents, directives, and public statements erased every mention of Islam, Qur’an, Shari’a, and jihad! The Obama national security team eliminated all-things-Islamic as causes of jihadist terrorism, and narrowed the focus down to “al-Qaeda” as the sole enemy to be fought! The elimination of Islam as a cause of terrorism and as a national security threat is a cynically transparent political move to define a potential worldwide threat pool of millions of Shari’a-motivated Islamic jihadists down to a few hundred shadowy al-Qaeda terrorists hiding in caves and deserts. According to Obama’s version of the threat facing the U.S., al-Qaeda fanatical terrorists are motivated to kill Americans by some unnamed, undefined, intangible “radicalism,” but not Islamic Shari’a.


Has Israel put a lid on terror attacks?

Based on data from the Israeli foreign ministry, 2012 has seen fewer terror related deaths than any year since Israel re-gained its independence in 1948.  Everyone has heard about Israel’s much publicized albeit extremely cautious and measured responses to the persistent barrage of mortars and rockets fired from Gaza.

To be sure, little has changed in Israel’s handling of these attacks.  The same cannot be said for aggressors who have been able to import weapons almost unimpeded since the Arab Spring removed the Mubarak government from power in Egypt.  Likewise, the Arab Muslims  occupying the Israeli territories of Samaria and Judea have continued their rock throwing, knife wielding attacks; so what has changed?

Israel’s Quiet War – Winning is not about making the most noise, sometimes these things go together but making noise and winning are not the same thing…

From (November 5, 2012)  The Quiet War:
While the rockets and air attacks grab all the headlines, Israel is fighting a less violent war against Palestinian terrorist groups. This includes arresting Palestinian businessmen who smuggle cash and goods to Hamas (in Gaza) and Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank that are recruited (or sometimes hired with that cash) in the West Bank. Israel has an extensive informant network in the West Bank, and some cooperation from the Fatah security forces in the West Bank. This enables Israeli police to spot new terrorist cells in the West Bank and make arrests. As a result there have been very few Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel over the last seven years. This despite the heated rhetoric from Palestinian media calling for more of these attacks.

The new Israeli security fence on the Egyptian border has halted the flow of illegal African immigrants. Some 60,000 Africans have sneaked into Israel in the last few years, but last month only 54 got across the border and all were caught. Before the fence was built as many as 2,000 a month got in.

In Lebanon Hezbollah continues to support the pro-Iranian Assad government in Syria. Hezbollah men have been seen fighting rebels in Syria. This has caused a loss of political support in Lebanon where most people hate Assad and support the rebels. The increased economic sanctions on Iran have meant less money for Hezbollah. All this has distracted Hezbollah from its plans for another war against Israel. Hezbollah is still strong in southern Lebanon, but if the Syrian rebels win, Hezbollah will lose a major supporter. This would strengthen anti-Hezbollah groups in Lebanon and lead to curbing Hezbollah’s power.

November 4, 2012: A mentally Palestinian man ignored Israeli warnings to stay away from the Gaza border fence and was shot dead. Palestinian terrorists are constantly trying to cross the fence or plant bombs on it.

November 3, 2012: For the first time in four decades, Syrian tanks entered the demilitarized zone on the Israel border. The three armored vehicles were apparently fighting rebels and soon withdrew. Israel complained to the UN, which is in charge of the zone.

October 31, 2012: In the West Bank Israeli police arrested five men and charged them with terrorism.

October 30, 2012: Israeli police entered the West Bank and arrested thirty members of a Hamas terror cell. Hamas has not been able to launch terror attacks into Israel from Gaza, and has been trying to establish terrorist cells in the West Bank. Israeli police and intelligence, with help from Fatah (that controls the West Bank) have so far prevented this.

October 29, 2012:  Gaza terrorists, including Hamas, fired 18 rockets at Israel. Most of these rockets were longer range factory made models and aimed towards Be’er Sheva.

In Sudan, two Iranian warships arrived for a visit. This was seen as a gesture of support after an Israeli air raid a week ago in Sudan that destroyed an Iranian financed weapons factory. Israel will not admit to the air raid and Iran will not admit to owning the factory but both countries are involved in a low key war along the Iranian weapons smuggling route through Sudan and into Egypt.

October 28, 2012: Two more factory made rockets (longer range 122mm models) were fired at Be’er Sheva and were not intercepted by Iron Dome missiles because the computer predicted the missiles would land in an unpopulated area. Israel air raids on Gaza killed a Hamas leader and Hamas promised retaliation

October 27, 2012: Israel aircraft attacked terrorist targets in Gaza in retaliation for rocket attacks on Israel. One of the targets was a rocket being set up for firing, which exploded on the ground instead.

In the West Bank Israeli police arrested a local Hamas politician and accused him of terrorism.

In Syria two senior Hamas officials were killed by Syrian troops in a Palestinian refugee camp. This was south of Damascus, in the largest Syrian refugee camps (Yarmouk, population 150,000, about 30 percent of the Palestinians in Syria). Hamas has gotten involved in the fighting between Palestinians loyal to the camp leadership (a Palestinian terrorist organization, which has long enjoyed the support of the Assads) and Palestinians who support the Syrian rebels. Palestinians realize that if the rebels win, and it looks like they will, they will be driven out unless pro-rebel Palestinians take control of Palestinian refugee camps (which are actually separate towns or neighborhoods occupied and run by Palestinians.) Hamas had long received support from the Assads. But under pressure from major donors (oil-rich Sunni Arabs) Hamas turned on the Iran-backed Assads. Earlier this year Hamas moved its headquarters out of Syria and openly denounced the Assaads. Hamas apparently also told the Syrian Palestinians to oppose Assad if they wanted Hamas and other Arab states to persuade the new rebel government to allow “loyal” Palestinians to remain and avoid retribution. The 600,000 Palestinians in Syria are 1.7 percent of the Syrian population.

October 26, 2012: Terrorists in Gaza have fired over a hundred rockets into Israel in the past week and were warned that Israel would send in ground troops if the attacks did not stop. The smaller terrorist groups in Gaza ignored a ceasefire negotiated by Egypt, which Hamas refused to enforce (for fear of triggering a civil war with the more radical terrorists).

Egypt: In public debate ‘Civil’ now means “anti-Sharia”

It was bound to happen.  The Muslim Brotherhood, long kept away from the political scene, has spoken and removed all doubt as to who they are and what they believe.  During the decades that the Muslim Brotherhood was banned from politics their true identity was easily and frequently confused.  Now that they are in the public eye all of the world’s worst suspicions are being confirmed.

Opinions about who the Muslim Brotherhood are may vary but the truth about who they are remains unchanged.  Their racist extremist views are so virulent, they have changed the terminology of the debate in Egypt.

Today, the world civil means anti-Sharia and anti-Muslim Brotherhood.  There is no civility in Islam their is only brutality.



The sacred Islamists and their frightened majority (Part 1)


Sunday, 04 November 2012

Mohamed Waked

To those unfamiliar with the “civil”/religious debate in Egypt, the term “civil” was recently dubbed to mark an assembly of disparate, sometimes conflicting, ideologies and positions that stand for the creation of what has come to be known as a “civil state.” This “civil state” is in turn commonly imagined as something that stands against a theocratic (Islamic) state, but not necessarily against political Islam per se — for there are several Islamic versions of the “civil.” The term “civil” forced itself on public debate for the first time perhaps during the 2005 parliamentary elections, when the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the only serious contender to the old ruling party. Since then, its evolution led it to acquire multiple meanings, like all other political signifiers. One can even make the ready argument that it is currently but an empty signifier, but such is true of all political signifiers (for example, the much cherished linguistic mess that we call “democracy”).

More recently, however, our young term started taking up either of two broad meanings: a secular position that accepts, be it unwillingly, the second article of Sadat’s/Mubarak’s constitution (the principles of Islamic Sharia are the origin of all laws), or certain Islamist positions that accept, albeit more unwillingly, some liberal and secular freedoms (e.g. the Wasat or Strong Egypt parties). It goes without saying that both “civil” and religious camps are composed of different, and sometimes opposing, political currents and entities.

During the past year or so, the term “civil” narrowed its focus further, as it began to refer only to the quasi-secular camp above. People now treat it as something that generally opposes the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state (but not “secular” in the technical sense). Currently this broad signification unites many different, ideologically antagonistic, secular political ideologies who pose as “civil” in an environment that doesn’t allow them to pose as “secular.” Islamists are therefore generally antagonistic to this camp, often conflating it with its largest constituency: the “liberals” (in the strict sense of the word), who do comprise the largest constituency of the “civil” camp, but are nevertheless not an overwhelming majority of it.

Since the revolution, the competition between the “civil” and Islamist camps has only been intensifying over time; eventually reaching the level of a cold civil war. And it makes sense that such a feud would escalate so much, for the stakes in it are extremely high. They revolve around not only who gets to rule, but also who gets to set the rules of the political game in the country, define the authorities of the ruler and the rights of the opposition, determine what will become of freedoms, rights, and obligations, set collective rights and wrongs, and the like. The development of the new constitution therefore naturally provides the main arena for this intense “cold war”. Recently the term “civil state” has spared outside Egypt; one can see it starting to organize politics in post-revolution Libya, for example.

The confident Islamist and the insignificant “civil”

Within this framework, the story goes, the various Islamist organizations are the only political players with real organic presence: they are close to the people, speak their language, know how to convince them, and thus best represent the interests of the great majority of Egyptians.

The “civil” camp, on the other hand, is generally represented as a tiny “Westernized” block that is furthest away from the people, and is often reduced to its largest constituency: the “liberals.” It is therefore common to bring this camp up as something that is generally elitist and always scared from a mighty Islamist block. Islamists commonly describe it pejoratively too: as an “insignificant” group with a big mouth and no influence whatsoever on the ground. They also commonly depict whatever strategies this supposedly “elitist” and “insignificant” block adopts as a form of “cheating” that is meant to deny the Islamists their “legitimate” right to represent “the people.” The malevolence of the “civil” camp, the Islamist argue, has no limits — for they can go as low as ally with the US, the military establishment, and the remnants of the old regime (known as “feloul”) to get their ways.

It goes without saying that the “civil” camp adopts negative views of the Islamists too. Space limitations aside, two main reasons drive me not to tackle them here. First, the shortcomings of the Islamist representations brilliantly expose the nature of the political impasse in Egypt. Secondly, the ruling regime is Islamist; Islamist representations are therefore “ruling” representations, at least in the technical sense. Not to mention that white postmodern scholars enjoy debunking the “civil” in Egypt and have as a result provided us with more than enough deconstructions of it.

Islamist panic attacks

Granting, recent developments have come to cast immense doubt over the “ruling” representation detailed above. For one, rallies and public demonstrations of the so-called “civil” camp have generally been staged by lower-middle class youth and not at all the elite. In fact, the “elite” was always reluctant to join them for reasons that are too long to bring up here. There is nothing exceptionally “Westernized” in these youth, either. That is to say, the Islamists’ generalizations about the social makeup of the “civil” camp are very visibly false—it’s more like they wish the “civil” camp to be so.

Nevertheless, the problem with our ruling representation goes well beyond one camp’s attempt to falsify the social makeup of its competitors. Our “ruling” representations fail miserably on another much more important account: they don’t account for the extreme sense of insecurity and panic that have come to color Islamists’ reactions since their ascendance to power. One would have expected that a mighty group that quite “naturally” represents “the people,” adopts the only “true” identity, is challenged only by an insignificant, elitist group — and the like of what Islamists in Egypt believe about themselves — would be much more confident than its “tiny,” supposedly insignificant enemy. But the developments of the past two weeks have shown that our mighty majority is extremely insecure and even frightened.

The Brotherhood’s decision to join the first anti-Mursi protest on 12 February is a case in point here. Several political groups had decided to stage an anti-Mursi rally to protest the failures of his first 100 days in office. The Brotherhood decided in turn to join this rally in order to acquire the right to change its goals—that is, to shift its goal away from opposing the MB president. Or so they had thought. They justified their participation in it by saying that the court’s acquittal of the accused in the Battle of the Camel case begs of all of us to forget our difference and ally together to depose of the Prosecutor General, who according to them conspired to assure the acquittal of the enemies of the revolution. Ironically, however, this was by far not the first case in which the courts acquitted “enemies of the revolution”; and the previous acquittals could not have passed as easily as they did without the Brotherhood’s political collusion. So people quite logically rejected the Brotherhood’s claim, and the “civil” protestors were determined to change neither the slogans nor the objectives of their rally. The Brotherhood insisted on participating in the rally to change its goals, nonetheless.

Naturally, both sides fought and the day ended in Brotherhood cadres beating up the “civil” protestors. During the clashes, MB cadres argued that they were only defending the choice of the majority— i.e. the elected Brotherhood president — against the plot of a mischievous minority that doesn’t “respect” democracy (i.e. the “civil” camp). Minding the fact that respecting democracy goes against beating up rallies on the grounds that they oppose an elected president, most people condemned the Brotherhood’s belligerence as something that stemmed from arrogance that they developed because of their power and relative strength. Others remarked that the MB’s arrogance is driving it to believe that it had the right to “protect” the “people” against anyone that disagrees with the MB — which spelled much danger in the future.

For some reason no one read what happened as a manifestation of the Brotherhood’s fears, if not panic. Ultimately the Brotherhood was too scared to let a small, supposedly insignificant and elitist anti-Mursi protest go as is. They felt compelled to co-opt it at any cost (and it was a big cost), although their plans went sour.

In response, the “civil” camp responded with a bigger protest against the MB itself, the first of its kind since the MB’s formation in 1929. The regional resonance of the protest quickly boosted anti-Ennahda protests in Tunisia, pushing the Brotherhood’s insecurities further. Eventually the Brotherhood started to fall back onto the SCAF’s old rhetoric, insecure as it was: according to Mursi, 600 paid thugs infiltrated the rally to trigger the fight between both camps, each being paid LE1000 by some unnamed agent provocateur to do so — the “third party” story, again! The SCAF was the first to circulate stories about an unknown “third party,” and its rule was: the more it felt insecure, the more “third party” stories it circulated.

Eid prayers followed a week later only to underline how insecure and scared the Islamists actually were, specially the Brotherhood. According to the press, including newspapers that are generally neutral towards the group, Brotherhood and Salafi preachers used the prayer sermon to “slaughter” the “civil camp,” attack the secularists, trash the labor movement, and more of the like. It seems that whichever Eid prayers the reporters went to cover, they all witnessed Brotherhood and Salafi preachers pouring venom on the “civil” camp and the labor movement.

Given the spread of the attacks, one is left with either of two conclusions: preachers from all over Egypt were organized to do so, or they panicked for some reason at the same time and rose to defend the Islamist camp on their own. Either case betrays an immense sense of Islamist fear from the “civil” enemy.


Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 5,694 other followers

%d bloggers like this: